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Eduard Jordaan
Affinities in the
socio-political thought of
Rorty and Levinas
Abstract This article considers the affinities in the socio-political thought
of Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Rorty. The writings of both display
considerable concern for the suffering of others. Both authors note the
importance of a self-critical subject becoming more aware of its own
injustice as very important for recognizing our responsibilities to others.
Furthermore, both stress the importance of recognizing the other outside
of the usual, objectifying categories, since it is the uniqueness of the other
that reminds us of our responsibility for the other. Both writers view the
liberal state as the best political forum in which to realize a fuller recog-
nition of and responsibility towards the other, a form of state in which the
ethical constantly interrupts the political. Rorty and Levinas disagree,
however, on the legitimacy of not responding to the other.
Key words Critchley · irony · justice · Levinas · liberal state · other ·
responsibility · Rorty · sentimental education
Introduction
Richard Rorty has been rather dismissive of the work of Emmanuel
Levinas. Levinas’ understanding of the other strikes Rorty as ‘gawky,
awkward and unenlightening’ and of little utility.1 Further, Rorty does
not see Levinas’ thought as holding much potential for dealing with
political issues and sees it at best as ‘useful to some of us in our indi-
vidual quests for private perfection’.2 Given Rorty’s apprehension about
Levinas’ work, it comes as little surprise that Rorty by and large rejects
Simon Critchley’s suggestion that he (Rorty) and Levinas are ‘in the
same line of business’,3 which Critchley bases on the claim that ‘Rorty’s
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definition of liberalism and Levinas’ definition of ethics [are] essentially
doing the same work, that is, attempting to locate a source for moral
and political obligation in a sentient disposition towards the other’s
suffering’.4 Critchley continues, ‘Do they both not agree that cruelty is
the worst thing that there is, and that, furthermore, this is the only social
bond that we need?’5
In this article, I want to take up Critchley’s proposition that Rorty
and Levinas are ‘in the same line of business’ by drawing attention to
some of the affinities in the socio-political thought of these two import-
ant thinkers. I shall further claim that their work is complementary in
a certain respect: Levinas spent much of his life trying to demonstrate
the ultimately irrepressible ethical relation with the other and the
concern and responsibility for the other this entails, whereas Rorty
bluntly asserts the importance of concern for the suffering of others,
which, for Rorty, is more or less all that is needed to unite people
socially.6 On the other hand, in Levinas’ thought, there is an absence of
politically practical suggestions, despite the fertile philosophical base he
has built, an absence that Rorty’s pragmatism is able to complement.
Regarding the affinities in Levinas’ and Rorty’s socio-political thought,
these will be organized along three lines: their understanding of a politi-
cal subject’s heightened sensitivity to the needs of others; the effecting
of escalating reminders (both in intensity and frequency) of the need
and suffering of others; and their views of the liberal state and society.
Before we proceed, a corrective is necessary, the corrective being a
brief summary of the political moment in Levinas,7 which serves to
temper the radical demands of the one-to-one ethical relation, the
extremity of which strikes some readers as hopelessly unrealistic. For
some reason, in the exchange surrounding the affinities (or the lack
thereof) between Rorty and Levinas, no mention has been made of the
political relation in Levinas’ thought, which centres on the notion of the
third.8 Not even Critchley makes any mention of the political moment
in Levinas in this debate, despite Critchley’s own clear discussion of this
very issue in an earlier work.9 In both Totality and Infinity and Other-
wise than Being or Beyond Essence, the exposition of the one-to-one
ethical relation is followed by a discussion where the subject and the
other are in the presence of the third,10 who also ‘looks at me in the
eyes of the other’, also summoning me to responsibility.11 The presence
of numerous others marks the limit of responsibility, as the subject
distributes its responsibility in equal measure to these numerous others.
The presence of the third introduces equality and justice, restoring the
subject to a position where it may now demand reciprocity from the
other. There is nothing chronological about the entry of the third – I
have always been in both an ethical and a political relation to the other.
In fact, another person is simultaneously the other and the third to me.12
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For Levinas, it is the ethical relation that makes possible the political –
‘the equality of all is borne by my inequality, the surplus of my duties
over my rights’.13 Ideally, there should be an intense oscillation between
the ethical and the political, but the tradition of political and philosophi-
cal thought is by and large a forgetting and suppression of the ethical
in the systematization, thematization and objectification that political
rationality requires and justifies.14 Levinas and Rorty are both
concerned with bringing about a greater reverberation of the ethical in
the political.
Having said this, let us pause for a moment at what Critchley thinks
puts Rorty and Levinas in ‘the same line of business’ and which drives
their respective projects, namely their sentient dispositions for the suffer-
ing of others and their shared view of cruelty as the worst thing we do.
It might be banal to say that cruelty is the worst thing we do,15 but, as
far as academic philosophy is concerned, the frequency with which
Rorty and Levinas concern themselves with cruelty, suffering and
oppression, coupled with the ‘social hopes’ they cherish, makes their
work quite remarkable. In Rorty, we find the sentience towards the
suffering of others in his definition of a liberal as someone ‘who thinks
that cruelty is the worst thing we do’16 which he bases on his rather
foundational claim that what unites humans is their shared ability to
feel pain.17 Rorty, however, does not offer much further explanation for
why this commonality should then proceed to assume the importance
it does. Similarly, Levinas feels that ethics is first philosophy, that is,
there is an irreducible ethical structure that underpins, enables, informs
and justifies theoretical thought and other forms of systematization. The
face of the other, that is, the other person as impossible to fully reduce
to a theme or concept, indicates the limit of systematization, and in fact
shows systematization to have been a forgetting and suppression of
what is other in the categories of the same. Unlike Rorty’s abrupt asser-
tion of the pivotal importance of sentience towards the other’s suffer-
ing, much of Levinas’ philosophical work has been devoted to
painstakingly demonstrating the human as that which ultimately cannot
be reduced to a theme, object or concept and to explore the ethical
awareness and responsibility that flow from such an awakening to the
other.
Levinas locates the underlying sentience for the suffering of others
in what he terms the saying, a non-linguistic sociality, a proximity to
the other outside of thematization, a fragile relation in which there is
always the danger of violating the other by placing him or her in a
system of relations. The fragility of the ethical saying is suggested as ‘a
movement that already carries away the signification it brought’ or as
a ‘disturbance [that] disturbs order without troubling it seriously’.18
Proximity is to be exposed to the vulnerability of the other who
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summons one to respond ethically, that is, in being unable to shirk one’s
responsibility for the other. To realize the responsibility of the ethical
saying in a concrete manner, there is a need for thematization, insti-
tutions, theories, science, decisions, etc., which Levinas summarizes as
the said. The non-linguistic saying needs the said to concretely respond
to the other, despite the fact that the (necessary and unavoidable) objec-
tification and thematization that characterize the said are a betrayal and
a suppression of the other’s uniqueness. It is the uniqueness of the other
that summons me to responsibility. Our infinite responsibility and the
guilty conscience that stems from never having done enough drive a
reduction of the betrayal of the saying that has occurred in the presence
of the third. Lessening the betrayal of the saying is possible in two ways:
through a heightened sensibility and vulnerability of the subject to the
other and by means of increased reminders of the needs of the other. I
will claim that these two ways correspond greatly to Rorty’s notions of
irony and sentimental education, respectively, to which we turn in the
next two sections. The liberal state is the best possible forum in which
the betrayal of the subject’s infinite responsibility for the other and of
the uniqueness of the other can be reduced, partly explaining Levinas’
and Rorty’s enthusiasm for the liberal state, which forms the focus of
the final section.
Heightened sensibility
A significant similarity between Rorty and Levinas lies in the emphasis
they place upon the importance of a subject becoming aware of its own
injustice and dominance of others and the increased self-questioning
such an awakening leads to. In both writers, there is the view that
persons too ensconced in their social and self-proclaimed identities
remain relatively blind to the needs of outsiders.
In the case of Rorty, the liberal ironist exemplifies individual self-
questioning, albeit that this putting into question of oneself does not go
as far as in the case of Levinas. The liberal ironist is deeply aware of
the potential perils of being too smitten with the contingent forms of
life one finds oneself in – ‘it is hard to be both enchanted with one
version of the world and tolerant of all others’.19 Ironists recognize the
coincidental character of their social identities, vocabularies and
relationships and worry about the possibility that they may have been
‘initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language
game’.20 Ironists are anxious about being ‘stuck’ in the vocabularies of
their particular social situation and being acquainted with only ‘the
people in their own neighbourhood’, so ironists spend their time
acquainting themselves with individuals and groups that strike them as
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unfamiliar.21 (For Levinas, ‘[t]he seeking out of the other man, however
distant, is already a relationship with this other man, a relation in all
its directness, which is already proximity’.22) When one recalls that for
Rorty moral concern is a matter of ‘we-intentions’,23 of solidarity, irony
becomes more than just a recognition of the contingency of one’s
personal identity – irony also becomes a recognition of one’s contingent
moral identifications and the arbitrary disregard for the suffering of
persons excluded from our ‘we’. Recognition of the contingent focus of
one’s moral concern leaves the ironist ambivalent about when to ‘favour
members of one’s family, or one’s community, over other, randomly
chosen, human beings’.24 When one further recalls Rorty’s definition of
a liberal (borrowed from Judith Shklar) as someone who ‘thinks that
cruelty is the worst thing we do’25 and who is sure to ‘notice suffering
when it occurs’,26 one (initially) comes to view the liberal ironist as
representing a person deeply concerned with the needs of others while
at the same time moving away from focusing his or her concern in any
narrow communitarian sense. Such a shift in the liberal ironist’s moral
attention allays charges of communitarian self-interest and reciprocity
and demonstrates the moral generosity of the liberal ironist.
For Levinas, proximity to the other puts my egoism into question –
it is a ‘crisis of being . . . because I begin to ask myself if my being is
justified, if the Da of my Dasein is not already the usurpation of
somebody else’s place?’27 The negativity of guilt for having already
expropriated the other becomes positive in expiation for the other, in
responsibility.28 Responsibility for the other is radically individualizing
– it ‘is the most profound adventure of subjectivity’,29 for ‘I can substi-
tute myself for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for me’.30
My election as unique summons me to the other, requires me to answer
in the first person – ‘it extracts me from the concept in which I continu-
ally take refuge’.31 In substitution, the subject no longer draws its
identity from what it has in common with others, from its place in a
system of relations, but is individualized through its response to the
other, saying ‘here I am’, a positioning of the subject that
. . . consists in inverting its identity, in getting rid of it. If such a desertion
of identity is possible without turning into alienation pure and simple, what
else can it be if not a responsibility for others, for what others do, even to
a point of being made responsible for the very persecution it undergoes.32
When one views fraternity as people being united by what they have
in common ‘the essence of society is lost sight of. . . . That all men are
brothers is not explained by their resemblance, nor by a common cause
of which they would be the effect.’33 The basis for sociality lies not in
human commonality, organization around a concept, but in its contrary,
in substitution, which ‘divests me without stop of all that can be
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common to me and another man, who would thus be capable of re-
placing me [if we were the same]’.34 Claiming one’s moral identity in
terms of what unites one with others, or merely claiming one’s identity
in the generality of being,35 offers the subject shelter from the permanent
ethical accusation by the other.
In thematisation, the plastic character of an object, the form, clothes and
protects the ego apparently exposed to critique. Apperceiving itself as
universal, it has already slipped away from the responsibilities to which I
. . . am bound, and for which I cannot ask replacements.36
Being a Rortian liberal ironist or a Levinasian elected subject seems
extremely demanding, for it requires an unremitting self-questioning
and a constant awareness of responsibilities to others. However, both
Rorty and Levinas undercut the ethical demands lain upon the subject
in similar ways. Upon first glance, the liberal ironist appears saintly in
her concern with the suffering and oppression of others, increasingly
shifting her focus to people formerly disregarded. However, Rorty
undermines the socio-ethical demands of being a liberal ironist (by
insisting on a sharp division between the public and the private and by
asserting the demands of each sphere to be ‘equally valid’37), to a point
where Rorty can be seen as justifying the choice to turn away from the
suffering of others so as to focus on one’s private self-creation. ‘[O]ur
responsibilities to others constitute only the public side of our lives, a
side which competes with our private affections and our private
attempts at self-creation, and which has no automatic priority over such
private motives.’38
Statements such as ‘I am responsible for the persecutions that I
undergo’ and ‘I am responsible for the other’s responsibility’ attest to
the demands of Levinasian ethics.39 However, the infinite demand of the
ethical relation is eased by the presence of the third person next to the
other, whose presence enables a ‘salvation’ of the subject, establishing
terms of equality and reciprocity between the subject and the other, as
was explained in the introductory section. In the presence of the third,
the subject is permitted time to pursue its own plans, to be for-itself. As
Critchley makes clear, my relation with the other is always both politi-
cal and ethical.40 The subject’s political relation with the other has
always already interfered with (and compromised) the ethical relation
with the other. Though it is the ethical relation that makes the political
possible, there is always the danger that the ethical is alienated and lost
in the impersonal political order.41 In modern political society, in which
people know each other through a concept (as a ‘that’), in which people
live indifferently ‘alongside’ one another, ‘there exists a tyranny of the
universal and the impersonal, an order that is inhuman though distinct
from the brutish’.42 The trend towards ‘inhumanity’, the forgetting of
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the ethical, is strengthened by the assumed legitimacy of being for-
oneself in the presence of the third, a trend that is garnering growing
approbation in our burgeoning global human rights culture, the tenets
of which are individualist. But, sociality, the ethical one-for-the-other, is
the command ‘not to remain indifferent to [the other’s] death, not to let
the other die alone; that is, an order to answer for the life of the other
man, at the risk of becoming an accomplice to that death’.43 What
would a politics more aware of the ethical entail? There would be an
intense and constant ‘vibration’ between the ethical and the political,
between being for the other and being for oneself, between guilt before
the other and insisting upon one’s rights against the other, an ambiv-
alence, an acknowledgement of ambiguity and complexity, hesitation
before every decision.
After sketching positions that seemingly demand much from the
subject in terms of assuming responsibility with regard to suffering
others, both Rorty and Levinas come to recognize the legitimacy of
private concerns vis-à-vis public responsibilities towards the other,
though Levinas does so fearing for the alienation and suppression of the
ethical. Rorty, on the other hand, has a clear conscience about choosing
for private self-concern, an option that he considers to be as valid as
choosing in favour of responsibility for others in the public sphere.
However, the growing recognition of individual human rights, coupled
with the individualism of pervasive neo-liberal economic principles, has
served to tilt the balance towards the political vis-à-vis the ethical
relation, reinforcing an asocial indifference of citizens existing in
equality.
The negative consequences of Rorty’s justification of asocial indi-
vidualism are offset by what he sees as a central feature of liberal
societies, the types of society in which we typically find such asocial
(liberal!) individualism. Liberal societies are characterized as having a
tradition whereby ‘the human stranger from whom all dignity has been
stripped is to be taken in, to be reclothed with dignity’,44 that is, soli-
darity is created with previously excluded people, and in Rorty’s
thought, solidarity is a precondition for moral concern. However, for
Levinas, the goodness of being for the other is not an attribute of
societies, but originates in the irreplaceable subject. ‘Goodness does not
radiate over the anonymity of a collectivity presenting itself panorami-
cally, to be absorbed into it. . . . It has a principle, an origin, issues from
the I, is subjective.’45
Rorty’s emphasis on solidarity, that is, moral concern as based on
seeing people as being ‘like us’, is problematical for various reasons:
there seems to be a contradiction in seeing strange people as being
like us; it is not clear that moral concern is in fact based on solidarity
(this seems more like calculation and reciprocity, rather than moral
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generosity and expiation); solidarity is undesirable because it is by defi-
nition exclusionary; we tend to create solidarity with people who need
it less (e.g. Americans with western Europeans); to what extent can we
actually establish solidarity with ‘strange people’ on the other side of
the world? Etc. Fortunately, one can discard the idea of solidarity while
still recognizing the value of the process whereby solidarity is estab-
lished, sentimental education. Sentimental education draws attention to,
or reminds us of, persons and groups we may have been cruel to or who
are suffering.
Increased proximity to the other
In both Rorty and Levinas there is a connection between an increased
concern for the other and the other’s approaching us outside of the more
typical categories in which it is usually presented. The static objectifica-
tion of the other in a concept hides his or her humanity, pre-empting
our recognition of him or her as unique. It is the uniqueness of the other,
what overflows categories of knowledge, that is ethical, that constitutes
what Levinas terms the ‘face’ of the other and is what reminds us of the
humanity of and our responsibility to this unique being. One area where
Rorty and Levinas differ is in focus and it is as such that we can see
their work as complementary in explaining the ethical approach of the
other. Levinas is more useful in suggesting why we do not recognize our
duties to the other when she or he is objectified, whereas Rorty is more
helpful in suggesting practical ways in which the other can confront the
subject as face (sentimental education).
According to Levinas, traditional philosophy and progressive
politics have tended to look for what is common among people and to
emphasize their similarity. While this is entirely understandable and
commendable given a world history of oppression, inequality, hatred
and racism, such an emphasis on human commonality has had the effect
of suppressing what is unique, what is other. While the Enlightenment
emphasis on the equality of persons has inspired great moral progress,
therein lies also a dark side, a side that glosses over the human in people,
that is, over their uniqueness. The aspiration towards a political society
in which citizens are equal constitutes a striving towards a social
arrangement in which persons become interchangeable units in a system
and life occurs indifferently alongside one another. Such equality masks
the ethical accusation of the subject in which she or he is responsible
for the other to the individuating point of substitution. However, in this
section our concern lies with the alterity of the other, not the election
of the responsible subject.
The political order in which each subject has his or her freedom
similarly and rationally preserved is an impersonal order that ‘consists
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in negating or in absorbing the other, so as to encounter nothing’.46 To
be approached by the other as face is to be struck by a human being
who ultimately cannot be reduced to a theme, who is resistant to total-
ization and who cannot be contained in a system. I am awakened to the
other ‘precisely when the other has nothing in common with me, when
the other is wholly other, that is to say, a human other’.47 The other is
‘at once what disturbs order and this disturbance itself’.48 The persist-
ent resistance by the other to objectification and thematization awakens
the subject to its prior domination of the other and muddles the subject’s
clear conscience. ‘The event of putting into question is the shame of the
I for its naïve spontaneity, for its sovereign coincidence with itself in the
identification of the same.’49 Proximity to the other is an event that
arrests the subject in its naïve freedom and makes it stand in front of
the other in a state of guilt, under accusation, responsible.50 Even
though in proximity the other is outside the grasp of the subject,
unmediated by a concept, the subject remains in an ethical relation with
the other. Proximity is contact without grasp. It is a relation of vulner-
ability, sensibility to the unique. ‘Proximity, difference which is non-
indifference, is responsibility’,51 the impossibility of abandoning the
other.52
However, the ethical relation is extremely fragile, given that the
other also already exists in a concept, a theme. In daily life it is imposs-
ible to interact with every person as though he or she were the only
person in the world. The other is an alterity that cannot speak its name,
for that would immediately mean a betrayal of the other’s uniqueness.
But this betrayal of the unique other whose uniqueness summons the
subject to responsibility, is unavoidable and necessary – one needs
systematization, knowledge, institutions, objectivity, etc., to concretely
respond to the other. Yet, Levinas recognizes that some ways of contain-
ing the saying in the said are less of a betrayal than others, or, put differ-
ently, ways of representing the other are more or less approximate to
the alterity of the other. So what Levinas, and with him Rorty, are after
‘is the gradual enlargement of our imagination’,53 so as to come closer
to the strangeness of the other (but which in turn opens onto an even
deeper awareness of the unfathomable uniqueness of the other).
Sentimental education is the process that harbours the potential
consequence that there will be an increase in moral concern, particularly
with respect to persons previously disregarded or unnoticed. Sentimen-
tal education is the drawing of attention to unnoticed or insufficiently
rectified oppression, cruelty and suffering. Sentimental education bears
the potential of making people feel ‘revulsion and rage where once they
felt indifference and resignation’.54 It is a process whereby our images of
others become less objectified, or in Levinasian terms, less of a betrayal
of the alterity of the other. Similarly, Rortian sentimental education
aspires to have people be viewed as ‘fully-fledged’,55 since pragmatists
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such as Rorty regard ‘personhood as a matter of degree, not an all-or-
nothing affair’.56 The instruments of sentimental education are novels,
movies and television programmes, which, for Rorty, are gradually
replacing ‘the sermon and the treatise as the principal vehicles of moral
change and progress’.57 Art and poetry can also act as conduits for senti-
mental education, in that these forms of expression create new reactions
to familiar situations through the use of new metaphors and ‘unfamiliar
noises’.58 In this process of sentimental education, Rorty further finds a
spot for political activism, whether purveyed through internal or
external agents, which can create splits and tensions in the dominant
discourse(s) and culture(s) so as to create space for new ideas to be
voiced and heard and for change to become possible59 – campaigns in
which the media is of central importance.60
Where sentimental education brings about moral progress (defined
as more people caring for more diverse people more often and more
intensely), such progress needs to be translated into social justice and
guaranteed through institutions and laws in order to benefit the other.
Rorty identifies ‘connoisseurs of diversity’ (sentimental educators, such
as journalists or anthropologists) who raise our awareness of persons
and groups excluded from justice, while ‘guardians of universality’
guarantee the equal treatment of all by public institutions.61 Sentimen-
tal education draws attention to the otherness spilling over the objec-
tifications of the other, otherness uncontained in the categories by which
we know the other, only for this overflowing of otherness to be enclosed
again in the objectifying categories of justice, institutions and knowl-
edge. However, this ensuing objectification is less of a betrayal than was
the initial view of the other. This is not just a gradual process, as society
comes to construct fuller identities of persons and groups, but also an
unending process, a striving for a society without suffering and oppres-
sion – a ‘justice always to be made more knowing in the name, the
memory, of the original kindness of man toward his other’.62 It is a
disposition Levinas describes as a
. . . rebellion against injustice that begins once order begins. . . . As if it
were a matter of a system of justice that accused itself of being senile and
decrepit as soon as there were institutions to protect it; as if, in spite of all
recourse to doctrine and to political, social, and economic sciences, in spite
of all references to reason and to techniques of revolution, man had sought
within revolution to the extent that it is disorder or permanent revolution,
a breaking of frameworks, an obliteration of ranks, liberating man, like
death, entirely, from everything and from the whole; as if the other man
were sought – or approached – in an otherness where no administration
could ever reach him; as if through justice a dimension opened up in the
other man, that bureaucracy, even if it were of revolutionary origin, would
block because of the very universality of the dimension.63
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For Rorty, the liberal is the type of person who exemplifies the
noticing of suffering wherever it might occur,64 whereas Levinas is less
clear about the political appellation of the subject doing the noticing.
What these two writers do agree upon, however, is that the liberal state
is best suited for such noticing of suffering and oppression and for moral
progress to occur.
Sentience for the other in the liberal state
Finally, I want to indicate Levinas’ and Rorty’s surprisingly similar views
of the liberal polity. In the political, that is, in the presence of the third,
the Levinisian subject is salvaged – there is a time to be for oneself,
although the burden of responsibility inescapably weighs on one. To
similar effect, Rorty demarcates a sharp distinction between the public
and the private spheres. In the political, there is a moment of decision
– is one to act for the other or for oneself? For Levinas, there is some
justification for (temporarily) not acting for the other – this is the signifi-
cance of equality. Not acting for the other can be further legitimized
through appeals to spurious, though legitimate, principles.65 Rorty
reaches a similar moment of in/decision – there is no indication when
private (for oneself) or public (for the other) concerns should predom-
inate. However, in both writers, there remains a bad conscience about
the effects of the autonomous subject’s exercise of freedom, about ‘the
tendencies to cruelty inherent in searches for autonomy’.66 The differ-
ence between the two writers is that Levinas is less willing to accept the
equal legitimacy of choosing either way, despite recognizing the accept-
ability of private concerns in the political order of the said. Further-
more, compared to Levinas, Rorty is too accepting of the lapse into the
equality of living alongside the other. From a Levinasian perspective,
this stands in tension with the sentient disposition for the suffering of
the other that exists so strongly in the liberal state, as sensibility for the
suffering of the other is what is not based on equality, but on the differ-
ence between subject and other.
Despite the aforementioned commonalities, the most striking simi-
larity between Rorty and Levinas regarding their view of the liberal state
is that both identify it as a political form in continuous search for a better
justice, as well as being the form of state most accommodating to such
a pursuit. Consider their exact words. For Levinas, in the liberal state
‘justice is always a revision of justice and the expectation of a better
justice’,67 ‘always concerned about its delay in meeting the requirement
of the face of the other’.68 Rorty, though still reflecting a view of moral
concern as based on solidarity, sees a virtue of liberal society as trying
to shake off the ‘curse’ off its inevitable ‘ethnocentrism’;69 ethnocentrism
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being the privileging of certain social categories, practices, relationships
and discourses that might have the effect of suppressing the otherness
of certain persons and obscuring their vulnerability as faces. Such blind-
ness to the other is overcome in the liberal state where the citizenry
‘prides itself on constantly adding on more windows, constantly enlarg-
ing its sympathies’.70
It appears as though ‘a sentient disposition towards the other’s
suffering’71 is the inspiration behind Rorty’s and Levinas’ strange char-
acterization of the liberal state. It further seems as though both writers
recognize that a better justice lies in drawing attention to the other
outside of the categories in which it is usually regarded, staid and
oppressive classifications in which the uniqueness of the other is lost.
Greater sensitivity to the suffering and needs of the other is a result of
noticing the other outside the forms in which it has been cast, for the
humanity of the other resides exactly in its resistance to forms of knowl-
edge and classification.
It is the freedoms people enjoy in liberal societies, relative to other
political forms, that make these societies so well suited for there to be
a deep concern with the other (as other). Irony, which Rorty only sees
as private, enables the public association with, and concern for other,
oppressed people. Though some citizens might deem concern for strange
other people unpatriotic or offensive, in liberal societies tolerance of
plurality is a public virtue and is judicially enforced. It is the breathing
space proffered freedom in liberal societies that enables the exposure of
injustice, oppression and suffering. Apart from an environment
conducive to asking for a reckoning in the name of the other, freedom
of expression, liberal education, government support for the arts and so
forth, assist in and encourage the creation of more nuanced images of
the other, representations more approximate to the uniqueness of the
other, and also makes the subject more aware of ways in which the other
has been oppressed and disregarded. Liberal societies, by definition,
welcome the constant struggle on behalf of oppressed otherness, making
‘life easier for poets and revolutionaries’.72
Despite the aforementioned heady humanism of the liberal state,
both Rorty and Levinas recognize the need for the state to objectify and
categorize unique persons, given the exigencies of governing a complex
society, but also given the importance of the principle of equality. Part
of the historical struggle for equality has been for the equality of all
citizens before the law. Though there has been a progressive trend to
make ever finer and more sensitive distinctions in order to take account
of social plurality, when it comes to applying the law, liberal societies
treat like cases alike. This means, for example, a similar categorization
of persons according to their crimes and a marginalization of their
uniqueness, of sentimental stories that might evoke pity. In a society
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based on ‘procedural justice’ ‘guardians of universality’ ought not to
pay too much attention to what is other about the criminal.
For if we had watched the war criminal grow up, had travelled the road
he had travelled, we might have had difficulty reconciling the demands of
love and of justice. But it is well for society that in most cases our ignor-
ance permits us to avoid this dilemma. Most of the time, justice has to be
enough.73
Here, we find Rorty emphasizing the importance of equality, though
he leaves a back door for a taking-into-account of the uniqueness of a
person, the ‘road he had travelled’. Without leaving such a back door
(‘Most of the time, justice has to be enough’) Rorty would have under-
mined and contradicted his view of liberal society as constantly asking
whether and how it has been cruel and oppressive, by, for example,
listening to a ‘long, sad, sentimental story’.74
Although the other always takes precedence over the subject in the
one-to-one ethical relation, in the political relation, that is, in the
presence of more than one other, there is a need for justice and judge-
ment. In the terms of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, where
the distinction between the saying and the said plays an important role,
the ethical saying needs the language, institutions, knowledge and
written texts of the said to regulate responsibility for the other, to decide
who is guilty, to prescribe what to do. However, the liberal state is
always aware of its violation of the other and mindful of the ethical
relation with the other, ‘a state questioning itself’,75 and as such
. . . legislation [is] always unfinished, always resumed, a legislation open to
the better. It attests to an ethical excellence and its origin in kindness from
which, however, it is distanced . . . by the necessary calculations imposed
by a multiple sociality, calculations constantly starting over again.76
Rorty and Levinas recognize the (inevitable) suppression of other-
ness in justice, the ‘bad conscience of justice’,77 (forgetting ‘the road the
other has travelled’, in Rorty’s terms) while also strongly associating
with the imperative to somehow let sensitivity to otherness seep into the
justice system of the liberal state. If one were to identify a difference
between Rorty and Levinas regarding justice in the liberal state, it would
be that there is a greater willingness on the side of Rorty to accept the
static objectivity of justice. For Levinas, ‘justice always [has] to be
perfected against its own harshness’.78 By contrast, consider, for
example, Rorty’s explanation that moral duties in a liberal democracy
are divided between ‘agents of love’ and ‘agents of justice’. Agents of
love draw attention to people who have not been considered as equals
in the workings of justice and proceed to show why these people should
be included as equals. On the other hand, agents of justice, or ‘guardians
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of universality, make sure that once these people are admitted as citizens,
once they have been shepherded into the light by the connoisseurs of
diversity, they are treated just all like the rest of us’.79 What we find
here, albeit implicitly, is Rorty reverting to his view that solidarity is the
basis for moral concern, that once strange people have been shown to
be like us, they may join us as equals. One of the problems with solid-
arity, and by the same token, equality, is that it covers over the face of
the other and the election of the responsible subject, as both the subject
and the other become interchangeable with other units in the system.
Despite the attention that has been paid to the affinities between the
social thought of these two writers throughout this article, and despite
the concern of both with the suffering of other people, a central point
of divergence between Rorty and Levinas turns on their disagreement
over the legitimacy of a turn away from concern for the other. For Rorty,
concern with the suffering and oppression of the other may end when
the other is granted rights equal to his or her former persecutors.
Furthermore, for Rorty, the subject may feel justified in concerning itself
with its private quests for self-creation, even in the face of the suffering
of others. In Levinas’ view, the equality of the other before the insti-
tutions of the state is not enough, for, in equality, there remains an
element of violence against the other, a violence that ‘appears even when
the hierarchy functions perfectly, when everyone submits to universal
ideas. There are cruelties that are terrible because they proceed from the
necessity of the reasonable Order.’80 It remains incumbent upon the
subject to see the ‘tears of the other’, ‘the tears that a civil servant cannot
see’.81 Further, the infinite responsibilities of the Levinasian subject
cannot accept the ‘equal validity’ of the liberal split between the public
and the private. So, when Rorty feels that pretty much all we need for
moral progress to occur is for there to be more liberals, we find Levinas
disagreeing through a rhetorical question asked 70 years ago, ‘We must
ask ourselves if liberalism is all we need to achieve an authentic dignity
for the human subject?’82
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